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ABORIGINAL TITLE AND SECTION 88 OF THE INDL4NACT
KENT MCNEILt

I.

INTRODUCTION

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia' firmly established that Aboriginal title lands are within
exclusive federal jurisdiction because they are encompassed by the words
"[lands reserved for the Indians" in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867.2 Delivering the principal judgment, Lamer C.J.C. went on to say
that Aboriginal rights generally, including both Aboriginal title and other
rights, are within "the core of Indianness which lies at the heart of s.
91(24)," and so "[p]rovincial governments are prevented from legislating
in relation to both types of aboriginal rights. 3 As a result, he concluded
that the provinces cannot extinguish Aboriginal title, either directly by
specific legislation, or indirectly by legislation of general application.
Moreover, he held that the power to extinguish Aboriginal title was not
conferred on the provinces by s. 88 of the Indian Act,4 which, with certain
exceptions to be considered below, makes provincial laws of general
application that "touch on the Indianness at the core of s. 91(24)" apply to

I owe a debt of gratitude to Chantal Morton for her invaluable research for this article. I
would also like to thank Brian Slattery, Bruce Ryder, and Kerry Wilkins for their very
helpful comments on a draft.
t Osgoode Hall Law School.
1[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at 1116-18, Lamer C.J.C. [hereinafterDelgamuukw].
2 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. Section 91(24)
provides that "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians," are under the exclusive
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada.
Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1119. La Forest J., for himself and L'Heureux-Dub6 J.,
delivered a concurring judgment, in which he differed somewhat from the Chief Justice
on the definition of Aboriginal title. However, on the issue of provincial authority to
extinguish Aboriginal title, he agreed with Lamer C.J.C.: ibid. at 1134.
4 R1S.C. 1985, c. I-5. Section 88 is reproduced in full in the text following note 18.
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"Indians," as defined in the Act, by referentially incorporating those laws
into federal law.5
Chief Justice Lamer nonetheless said that Aboriginal rights, including
Aboriginal title, can be infringed by provincial governments, 6 provided
that the infringements can be justified by meeting the test laid down in R.
v. Sparrow.7 But given his conclusion that Aboriginal rights are at the
"core of Indianness" and therefore within exclusive federal jurisdiction,
what is the basis for this power of infringement?8 Lamer's position on this

6

Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1121-22. See R. v. Dick, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309 [hereinafter
Dick]. The term "Indians," as used in s. 91(24), encompasses Inuit as well as Indians,
and is more inclusive than the same term in the Indian Act. However, it is still uncertain
whether Mdtis are also included in s. 91(24): seeReference re: British North America
Act, 1867 (U.K.), s .91, [1939] S.C.R. 104, and discussion in C. Chartier, "'Indian': An
Analysis of the Term as Used in Section 91(24) of the British North America Act,
1867" (1978-79) 43Sask. L. Rev. 37. For a recent decision suggesting that M~tis are not
so included, see R. v. Blais, [1998] 4 C.N.L.R. 103 (Man. Q.B.), leave to appeal
granted, [1999] 2 W.W.R. 445 (Man. C.A.); compareR. v. Rocher, [1982] 3 C.N.L.R
122 (N.W.T. Terr. Ct.), aff'd [1985] 2 C.N.L.R. 151 (N.W.T.C.A.);R. v. Grumbo,
[1998] 3 C.N.L.R. 172 (Sask. C.A.).
Delgamuukw, supra note I at 1107. Note that while Lamer C.J.C. did use the word
"governments" in this context, he must have meant the legislative rather than the
executive branch of governments, as it is fundamental to the rule of law that the
executive branch cannot infringe legal rights (let alone constitutionally protected rights)
without unequivocal statutory authority. See K. McNeil, "Racial Discrimination and
Unilateral Extinguishment of Native Title" (1996) 1 A.I.L.R. 181, esp. 185-90; K.
McNeil, "Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Property Right," in 0.
Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme Court's
Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2000) 55.
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter Sparrow]. This test was created by the Court to
justify infringements of Aboriginal rights that are constitutionally protected by s. 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to theCanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11. Section 35(1) provides: "[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." Briefly,Sparrow
decided that an infringement can be justified if it is pursuant to a compelling and
substantial legislative objective, and respects the Crown's fiduciary obligations to the
Aboriginal people in question. See also R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723,
commented on in K. McNeil, "How Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of
Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified?" (1997) 8:2 Constitutional Forum 33.
Lamer C.J.C. relied on his own judgment in R. v. C6t, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter
Ct9]. However, in that case he did not address the issue of how the provincial power of
infringement can be reconciled with exclusive federal jurisdiction. Instead, he relied on
R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 [hereinafterBadger].However, in Badger legislative
power in relation to Indian hunting was specifically conferred on the province of
Alberta by the Natural Resources TransferAgreement, which was given constitutional
force, "notwithstanding anything in the British North America Act, 1867" (now the
Constitution Act, 1867), by s. 1 of the Constitution Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 26
(U.K.), reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 26. SoBadger is not authority for any
generalprovincial authority to infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights. For a more detailed

SECTION 88 OF THEINDIANACT

is all the more puzzling because he clearly stated that this core is
protected "from provincial intrusion, through the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity." 9 As that doctrine prevents any provincial
intrusion into the heart of areas of federal jurisdiction, and provincial laws
that infringe Aboriginal rights would seem to so intrude, it is difficult to
understand how Lamer was able to sanction provincial infringements of
those rights.10
One possible answer to this conundrum is that Lamer thought that s.
88 of the Indian Act, while not conferring jurisdiction on the provinces to
extinguish Aboriginal rights, does allow the provinces to infringe those
rights. In his discussion of this section, he said this:
...IS]. 88 extends the effect of provincial laws of general application which
cannot apply to Indians and Indian lands because they touch on the
Indianness at the core of s. 91(24). For example, a provincial law which
regulated hunting may very well touch on this core. Although such a law
would not apply to aboriginal people proprio vigore, it would still apply
through s. 88 of the IndianAct, being a law of general application."
In reaching this conclusion, Lamer relied mainly upon Dick,'2 where
the Supreme Court held that provincial hunting laws of general
application that touch on the core of Indianness without infringing treaty
rights are referentially incorporated by s. 88.13 However, as Dick did not
involve Aboriginal title or even an Aboriginal right to hunt, that judgment
did not determine whether referentially incorporated provincial laws can
discussion, see K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking
Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction" (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431 at 448-53.
9 Delgamuukw, supra note I at 1119.
10 For further discussion, see McNeil, supra note 8; N. Bankes, "Delgamuukw, Division of
Powers and Provincial Land and Resource Laws: Some Implications for Provincial
Resource Rights" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317; A.C. Peeling, "Provincial Jurisdiction
After Delgamuukw" (Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia
Conference, Vancouver, B.C., 25 March 1998); K Wilkins, "Of Provinces and Section
35 Rights" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 185.
1" Delgamuukw, supra note I at 1122 [emphasis added].
12 Supra note 5.For critical commentary, see L. Little Bear, "Section 88 of the Indian Act
and the Application of Provincial Laws to Indians," in J.A. Long and M. Boldt, eds.,
Governments in Conflict? Provinces and Indian Nations in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1988) 175 at 180-87; B. Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of
the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces
and First Nations" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308 at 370-80.
13 Treaty rights are expressly protected by s. 88 from the provincial laws that are made
applicable to Indians by that section: see. v. Simon, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 [hereinafter
Simon]; Sioui v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 [hereinafterSioutl;
C6t, supra note 8.
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infringe Aboriginal rights.14 Nor did Lamer address this issue directly in
Delgamuukw. However, in holding that s. 88 does not authorize
provincial extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, he did say that "the
explicit reference to treaty rights in s. 88 suggests that
the provision was
15
clearly not intended to undermine aboriginalrights."'
Moreover, while the longer passage from Delgamuukw quoted in the
previous paragraph referred to both "Indians and Indian lands," I
seriously doubt that, by mentioning "Indian lands" in the context of s. 88,
Chief Justice Lamer meant to imply that the section referentially
incorporates provincial laws that would not otherwise apply to those lands
because of s. 91(24). This is especially so because a long-standing body
of case law has held the exact opposite.16 In an earlier article, I found it
"inconceivable that the Chief Justice intended to overrule those decisions
with such vague language, without reference to them and without any
'7
discussion of the compelling arguments against such an interpretation."'
Since writing that article, however, I have heard enough people express a
contrary view of Lamer's judgment that I think the matter deserves more
detailed consideration. The main purpose of the present article is therefore
to examine the question of whether s. 88 does indeed authorize provincial
infringements of Aboriginal title by referentially incorporating provincial
laws in relation to land and making them apply to "[ljands reserved for
the Indians."
II.

SECTION 88 OF THE INDIAN ACT

Section 88 was added to the Indian Act (as s. 87) in 195 1." It provides as
follows:

14

See also R. v. Kruger, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 [hereinafter Kruger].

15 Delgamuukv, supra note I at 1122-23 [emphasis added]. CompareR. v. Alphonse,
[1993] 5 W.W.R. 401 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafterAlphonse];R. v. Dick, [1993] 5 W.W.R.
446 (B.C.C.A.) These cases, and the matter of the application of the justification test in
the context of s. 88 generally, are discussed in the text accompanying notes 34-49.
16
The case law is discussed in the text accompanying notes 55-72.
17

McNeil, supra note 8 at 447. See also Bankes,supra note 10 at 334-35. In Stoney Creek
Indian Band v. British Columbia, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 192 (B.C.S.C.) at 205 [hereinafter
Stoney Creek], Lysyk J. also doubted whether "this passing reference [to Indian lands in
the context of s. 88] by the Chief Justice was intended to be a considered conclusion
that s. 88 extends otherwise inapplicable provincial laws not only to Indians but also to
Indian lands." This decision was reversed on appeal, sub nom. Stoney Creek Indian
Band v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., [2000] 2 C.L.N.R. 345 (B.C.C.A.), without mention of
this issue. Leave to appeal to the S.C.C. was refused, [2000] 3 C.L.N.R. iv.
By S.C. 1951, c. 29.
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Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of
general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable
to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that those
laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation, or by-law
made thereunder, and except to the extent that those laws make provision for
any matter for which provision is made by or under this Act.
At the time this section was enacted, it was unclear whether
Aboriginal title-or indeed any Aboriginal rights-existed at common
law in the absence of recognition by the Crown in the Royal Proclamation
of 1763, a treaty, or other governmental act. 19Not until 1973 in Calderv.
Attorney-General of British Columbia20 was it decided, in the words of
Hall J. (dissenting on other grounds), that "aboriginal Indian title does not
depend on treaty, executive order or legislative enactment.",2 1 The preCalder lack of judicial acknowledgment of common law Aboriginal rights
may explain why s. 88 accorded protection against provincial laws of
general application to treaties, but not to Aboriginal rights, as the federal
government was probably of the view that no such rights existed.22 The
treaties, on the other hand, were positive agreements between the Crown
and the Aboriginal parties, dealing with rights and obligations that the
federal government was obliged to respect. 23 It is therefore not surprising
19 In R. v. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.)

[hereinafter St. Catherine'sMilling], the leading case on Aboriginal land rightsat the
time, Lord Watson found the Royal Proclamation to be the source of Indian title to land:
see Guerin v. Canada,[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 377, Dickson J.[hereinafter Guerin].
20 [1973] S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter Calder].
21 Ibid. at 390. See also Guerin, supra note 19 at 377 and 379, where Dickson J. quoted

these words from Hall's judgment with approval.
22 See Canada, House of Commons Special Committee appointed to consider Bill No. 79:
An Act Respecting Indians, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (Ottawa: Queen's

Printer, April 1951) at 167-71, where what is now s. 88 was discussed. The whole focus
of the discussion was on the preservation of treaty rights, especially to hunt and fish.
Aboriginal rights as such were not mentioned. For further evidence of this focus on
treaty rights at the time, see K. Wilkins, "'Still Crazy After All These Years': Section
88 of the Indian Act at Fifty" (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 458 at 462. Later, in its infamous
White Paper, entitled Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969

(Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1969) at 11, the government
expressed the view that Aboriginal land claims were "so general and undefined that it is
not realistic to think of them as specific claims capable of remedy except through a
policy or program that will end injustice to Indians as members of the Canadian
community."
23 See Attorney-Generalfor the Dominion of Canadav.Attorney-Generalfor Ontario,

[1897] A.C. 199 (P.C.). However, prior to the enactmentof s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982, there was no protection against federal legislative infringement of treaty
rights: see R. v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150 (N.W.T.C.A.), aff'd [1964] S.C.Rt
642; R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267;Danielsv. White, [1968] S.C.R. 517. Compare
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that s. 88 would protect treaty rights against inconsistent provincial laws,
while failing to mention Aboriginal rights. Indeed, any reference to
Aboriginal rights in s. 88 would have amounted to a legislative
acknowledgment of the existence of those rights, which the federal
government may well have been anxious to avoid.
After judicial acknowledgment of Aboriginal land rights in Calder,
the failure to protect Aboriginal rights from provincial laws in s. 88
appeared to be an anomaly. The point was raised in Kruger, decided in
1977:
It has been urged in argument that Indians having historic hunting rights
which they have not surrendered should not be placed in a more invidious
position than those who entered into treaties, the terms of which preserved
those rights. However receptive one may be to such an argument on
compassionate grounds, the plain fact is that s. 88 of the Indian Act, enacted
by the Parliament of Canada, provides that "subject to the terms of any treaty"
all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are
applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except as stated. The
terms of the treaty are paramount; in the absence of a treaty provincial laws of
general application apply.24
Prior to the enactment of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,25 it
therefore appears that the parliamentary process of legislative amendment
simply did not keep pace with the development of Aboriginal rights law
by the Supreme Court.
Since s. 35(1) recognized and affirmed existing Aboriginal and treaty
rights, the failure to shield Aboriginal rights in s. 88 became less
important, as those rights were now accorded constitutional protection. 6
But more fundamentally, s. 35(1) placed the constitutional validity of s.
88 in question. Professor Brian Slattery, in an article published prior to
the release of the Delgamuukw decision, argued that provincial laws on

24

Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Attorney General of Canada, [1999] O.J. No. 1406 at
paras. 539-93 (Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Chippewas of Sarnia], currently on appeal to the
Ont. C.A.
Kruger,supra note 14 at 114-15.

2

Supra note 7.

26

Ironically, however, if the provinces can infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights as long as
they meet the test of justification (see note 7), s. 88 provides more protection to treaty
rights than s. 35(1) because the courts have never allowed justification of provincial
laws that would infringe treaty rights in the context of s. 88: seeC6t, supranote 8 at
191-92, Lamer C.J.C. See also McNeil, supra note 8 at 452, suggesting that this fact
should have led the Chief Justice to question the authority of the provinces to infringe
Aboriginal and treaty rights in the context of s. 35(1). This matter was referred to, and
left unresolved, by Cory J. in his unanimous judgment inR. v. Sundown, [1999] 1
S.C.R. 393 at 418 [hereinafter Sundown].

2000
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their own cannot prevail over Aboriginal rights because, unlike
Parliament, "the Provinces do not possess the power to legislate in
relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights. 27 If this principle is correct, he
said,
...
[lt follows that the Federal Parliament cannot subvert the overall
constitutional scheme by enacting legislation for Aboriginal peoples that
referentially incorporates a wide range of Provincial statutes that could not
otherwise apply to First Nations under the division of powers. Such Federal
legislation, it is submitted, would seriously affect the Aboriginal right of selfgovernment under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and cannot meet
the Sparrow standard ofjustification. So, section 88 of the current Indian Act,
which referentially makes applicable to Indians "all laws of general
application from time28 to time in force in any province" is of doubtful
constitutional validity.
While Slattery was addressing this issue in the context of a right to
self-government, his argument can also be applied to Aboriginal rights
generally. Although he did not elaborate on why s. 88 could not meet the
Sparrow justification test, one can readily see how he reached this
conclusion: the burden of proving a compelling and substantial legislative
as required
objective, and respecting the Crown's fiduciary
30 obligations,
by the test,29 might well be impossible to meet.
However, Slattery's argument appears to relate only to provincial laws
that infringe the rights protected by s. 35(1). Are there provincial laws of
general application that could be referentially incorporated by s. 88
without infringing those rights? The answer depends upon whether the
"core of Indianness at the heart of s. 91(24)" is limited to matters relating
to Aboriginal and treaty rights, or is broader than that. While Chief
Justice Lamer did not fully define the extent of the core of federal
jurisdiction in Delgamuukw, 31 earlier case law indicates that it does
include exclusive jurisdiction over the status and capacity of Indians,
27

28

B. Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can.
Bar Rev. 261 at 285.
Ibid. at 285-86 [footnote omitted].

29 See Sparrow,supra note 7.
30 See also McNeil, supra note 8 at 440-41: "How would th[e] honour of the Crown
[which is intimately connected with the Crown's fiduciary obligations] be upheld by
Parliamentary delegation of authority to the provinces to infringe Aboriginal rights
through the mechanism of referential incorporation? Would this not be a dishonourable
abdication of the responsibility that was placed primarily on the federal government by
s. 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct, 18679"
3

Supra note I at 1116-21. But as we have seen, he did decide that all Aboriginal rights
are within that core: see text accompanying note 3.
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whether or not Aboriginal or treaty rights are involved. 32 The case law
therefore suggests that the core of federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24), to
which the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity applies, extends
beyond those rights. If so, then there is some room for s. 88 to operate
without infringing Aboriginal or treaty rights. In that case, if Slattery is
correct (as I think he is) that federal authorization of provincial
infringements of those rights is unconstitutional, then s. 88 would not be
invalid, but would have to be read down in order for referential
33
incorporation to exclude provincial laws having that effect.
It has nonetheless been held by the British Columbia Court of Appeal
in R. v. Alphonse and R. v. Dick34 that s. 88 does not have to be justified
under the Sparrow test, as the section does not itself infringe Aboriginal
rights. Instead, it is the provincial laws that are referentially incorporated
by the section that are in need of justification if an infringement is shown.
But this seems to place the burden of justification on the provinces, when
in fact they are not responsible for the application of these referentially
incorporated laws to Indians.35 If the British Columbia Court of Appeal's
approach in these cases is correct, then Parliament, through the
mechanism of s. 88, has succeeded in casting responsibility onto the
provinces without their participation or consent, and has also been able to
wash its hands of the matter without justifying this abdication of
32

See Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751 at 760-63,
Laskin C.J.C. [hereinafter Natural Parents], cited with approval in Bell Canada v.
Quebec (Commission de la santg et de la sicuritg du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R 749 at
833-36 [hereinafter Bell Canada]. See also Four B Manufacturing Limited v. United
Garment Workers of America and Ontario Labour Relations Board, [1980] 1 S.C.R.
1031 at 1047-48 [hereinafter Four B Manufacturing]. In Dick, supra note 5, Beetz J.
assumed from the facts that the Indianness at the core of s. 91(24) was impaired by a
provincial game law, even though no Aboriginal or treaty rights were involved. On the
other hand, it appears from R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025 [hereinafterFrancis],
that federal jurisdiction extends beyond this core, as La Forest J., for the Court,
implicitly accepted the validity of the federal Indian Reserve Traffic Regulations,
C.R.C. 1978, c. 959, even though traffic laws do not touch on Indianness. As traffic
control generally falls under provincial jurisdiction, there is an area of concurrent
jurisdiction where, subject to federal paramountcy, provincial laws of general
application apply of their own force to Indians, both on and off reserves.

33

See Wilkins, supra note 10 at 233.

34

Supra note 15. See also R. v. Sundown, [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 241 at 260 (Sask. C.A.),
Vancise J.A., affirmed without reference to this issue, Sundown, supra note 26.

3

In Dick, supra note 5, the Supreme Court held that the only provincial laws that are
referentially incorporated by s. 88 are laws of general application that would not
otherwise apply to Indians because they touch on Indianness. Provincial laws that are
not in relation to Indians, and do not touch on Indianness or lands reserved for the
Indians, apply to Indians of their own force. See also Francis, supra note 32 at 1028-29;
Delgamuukw, supra note I at 1119-20.
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responsibility to the Aboriginal peoples whose rights are affected. This
state of affairs cannot be right if the constitutional principles of division
responsibility for s. 91(24) "Indians" have any
of powers and federal 36
meaning in this context.
These and other problems with the Alphonse/Dick approach to s. 88
have been addressed in greater detail by Kerry Wilkins in a perceptive
recent article entitled "Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights. 37 He points
out that decisions and activities that infringe Aboriginal rights, in this
instance by means of s. 88, can only be made by the federal government,
pursuant to federal objectives, because the provinces are barred by the
division of powers from doing so. He continues:
These federal decisions, activity and objectives, I am arguing, are what need
justification under s. 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982. In the constitutional
sense, the provinces have nothing to do with them. If Canada had chosen
instead to enact, one by one, its own measures duplicating, for Indians, the
effects of selected existing provincial laws, no one would suggest that any s.
35 inquiry should focus exclusively-or at all-on the inapplicable provincial
38
prototypes. In one respect, s. 88 does exactly that, only by different means.
Moreover, Wilkins points out that, as the reasons for enacting s. 88
and the policy objectives behind the provincial laws incorporated by it are
necessarily different, "[a]n inquiry into s. 88's own justifiability,
therefore, must be independent of any possible inquiry into the merits of
any of the provincial laws it incorporates. 39
Wilkins also relies on a passage from R. v. Adams where Lamer C.J.C.
stated that, "[i]n light of the Crown's unique fiduciary obligations towards
aboriginal peoples, Parliament may not simply adopt an unstructured
discretionary administrative regime which risks infringing aboriginal
rights in a substantial number of applications in the absence of some
explicit guidance." 40 Without such guidance, Lamer said, "the statute will
36

E.g. see Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 123 and 126 [hereinafter
Mitchell], where La Forest J. referred to "the federal Crown's plenary responsibility
respecting 'Indian Lands' and "its obligations to native peoples, be it pursuant to its
treaty commitments, or its responsibilities flowing from s. 91(24)." In his concurring
judgment at 105 and 108-09, Dickson C.J.C. also spoke of "the constitutional
responsibility of Parliament for Indians and Indian lands," and added: "since 1867, the
Crown's role has been played, as a matter of federal division of powers, by Her Majesty
in right of Canada, with the Indian Act representing a confirmation of the Crown's
historic responsibility for the welfare and interests of these peoples."

38

Wilkins, supra note 10.
Ibid.at 229.

39

Ibid.at 230 [emphasis in original].

40

[1996] 3 S.C.R 101 at 132 [hereinafter Adams].

37
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fail to provide representatives of the Crown with sufficient directives to
fulfil their fiduciary duties, and the statute will be found to represent an
infringement of aboriginal rights under the Sparrow test."4 1 As Wilkins
observes, there is a close parallel between s. 88 and the kind of
administrative scheme the Chief Justice found unacceptable in Adams:
The scheme at issue in Adams left the exercise of the appellant's aboriginal
fishing rights at the mercy of a minister's discretion; section 88 exposes a
broader range of aboriginal rights to an indefinite, and constantly changing,
array of provincial procedures and standards all of which, upon incorporation
into federal law, operate to govern matters constitutive of Indianness. The
Adams scheme contained no specifications or criteria that could have helped
ensure that the minister gave sufficient regard, in the exercise of the
discretion, to the existence and the scope of any aboriginal right; s. 88
contains no specifications that help ensure that any scheme it incorporates will
operate with sufficient regard for aboriginal rights.42
Wilkins concludes that s. 88 itself is in need of justification, and
doubts whether that is possible, even if one assumes that the objectives
behind it are compelling and substantial.43 In his view, s. 88 does not meet
the Sparrow requirements of "as little infringement as possible in order to
effect the desired result," and "sensitivity to and respect for the rights of
aboriginal peoples." 44 I agree. As he states, s. 88 "makes no allowance
whatever for aboriginal rights, either by according them some statutory
priority (as it did for treaty rights), or by requiring some prior review of
incorporated statutes
to ensure some threshold of sensitivity or of
45
proportionality.,
Wilkins' arguments also suggest to me that, for fidamental structural
reasons, it may not be possible to apply the Sparrow test in order to
justify infringements of Aboriginal rights by laws incorporated by s. 88.
As he points out, the provinces have no constitutional authority to
infringe those rights on their own, and so cannot intend to do so when
they enact laws of general application. So how can the provinces address
the issue of justification of infringements caused by s. 88's referential
incorporation of those laws? If it is infringement by the incorporated laws
that has to be justified (as Alphonse and Dick held), how could a province
41

Ibid. See also R. v. Marshall,[1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 at 504-5, where Binnie J. applied this
section of Lamer's judgment in Adams, supra note 40.

42

Wilkins, supra note 10 at 230-3 1.

43

Objectives he suggests are "filling gaps in the federal law and harmonizing the legal
regimes to which statutory Indians will be subject from time to time" ibid. at 232.

44

Ibid. at 232, quoting Sparrow,supra note 7 at 1119.

45

Wilkins, supra note 10 at 233 [footnotes omitted].
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show a compelling and substantial objective, respect for the Crown's
fiduciary obligations, consultation, and so on, without revealing an
unconstitutional intention to infringe Aboriginal rights? On the other
hand, if it is the federal government that has to justify infringement by
incorporated provincial laws, how can that government establish a
compelling and substantial objective, etc., when Parliament had nothing
in fact to do with the enactment of the provincial law in question? It
therefore appears that referential incorporation of laws that infringe
Aboriginal rights-especially the broad range of laws that s. 88 purports
to encompass-is incompatible with the requirements for justification
established by Sparrow. If this is correct, the ability of s. 88 to
incorporate those laws has been destroyed by s. 35(1) and the justification
test.
In summary, the constitutional validity of s. 88 really depends on
whether it incorporates any provincial laws that do not infringe
Aboriginal rights. If it does, as the pre-Delgamuukw jurisprudence
suggests, then it is still valid, but should be read down to limit its
application to the incorporation of those laws. However, if the only laws
incorporated by it are laws that infringe Aboriginal rights, for the reasons
outlined above it should be struck down because it violates s. 35(1). This
approach would eliminate the discrepancy in the treatment of Aboriginal
and treaty rights under s. 88, the historical justification for which
disappeared
46 when Aboriginal rights were acknowledged by the Supreme
Court. It would also be more consistent, in the words of Lord Watson,
46

It could be argued that, after judicial acknowledgment of these rights and enactment of
the Constitution Act, 1982, s. 88 offends the equality provision in s. 15(1) of the
Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of theConstitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter] by
distinguishing between treaty Indians and other Aboriginal peoples. SeeCorbiere v.
Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, holding that s.
77(1) of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, requiring Indian band members to be
"ordinarily resident" on a reserve to be able to vote in band council elections, violates s.
15(1); R. v. Morin and Daigneault,[1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 157 (Sask. Prov. Ct.), holding
that the Saskatchewan FisheryRegulations, made pursuant to theFisheriesAct, R.S.C.
1985, c. F-14, violate s. 15(1) because they require Mtis to purchase fishing licences
which Indians receive at no cost (in affirming this decision on other groundssub nom.
R. v. Morin, [1998] 1 C.N.L.R. 182 (Sask. Q.B.), Laing J. said at 205 that "the trial
judge should not have based his decision on theCharterwhen the same was not part of
the argument made before him without first giving counsel the right to addressthe
argument," and that "resort to the Charter was unnecessary" in the circumstances).
Compare Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 145 (S.C.C.); Perry v. Ontario,
[1998] 2 C.N.L.R. 79 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 18 Dec. 1997,
[1998] 1 C.N.L.R. iv (S.C.C.). See alsoAlphonse, supra note 15 at 443-45, Lambert
J.A., where he relied on the discriminatory treatment of non-treaty Indians by s. 88 to
conclude, without reference to s. 15(1), that provincial game laws that infringe
Aboriginal rights are not laws of general application for the purposes of s. 88; compare
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with the "plain policy" of Canada's Constitution, whereby, "in order to
ensure uniformity of administration, ... Indian affairs generally [were
placed] under the legislative control of one central authority. '' 4 7 As a
result, "the government vested with primary constitutional responsibility
for securing the welfare of Canada's aboriginal peoples" 48 would no
longer be able to use s. 88 to avoid its fiduciary obligation to respect
Aboriginal rights.
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutional
impeachability of s. 88. But what if, despite what I think are compelling
arguments to the contrary, the Court adopts the Alphonse/Dick approach
and upholds the section's referential incorporation of provincial laws that
infringe Aboriginal rights, as long as the infringement can be justified? Is
the incorporation limited to applying provincial laws of general
application to "Indians," or are those laws made applicable to "lands
reserved for the Indians" as well? The rest of the article will focus on this
issue.
III.

CASE LAW ON THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 88 TO
"LANDS RESERVED FOR THE INDIANS"

Before determining whether s. 88, if it is constitutionally valid and does
not have to be read down, makes provincial laws in relation to land apply
to "lands reserved for the Indians" (s. 91(24) lands), we need to know if
any of those laws can apply to those lands of their own force. 49 On this
issue, the courts have generally held that provincial laws in relation to
land, and in particular, laws that relate to the possession or use of land,
cannot apply proprio vigore to s. 91(24) lands.50 However, provincial
Macfarlane J.A. at 417-20. Further discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the
present article.
47 St. Catherine'sMilling, supra note 19 at 59.
48 Delgamuukw,supra note I at 1118, Lamer C.J.C.
49 For a more detailed discussion, see McNeil, supra note 8 at 457-62.

50 See PeaceArch v. Surrey (1970), 74 W.W.R. 380 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafterPeace Arch],
cited with apparent approval in Cardinalv. Attorney General of Alberta, [1974] S.C.R.
695 at 704-05, Martland J. (for the majority), at 718-19, Laskin J. (dissenting on other
grounds) [hereinafter Cardinal]; R. v. Isaac (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 (S.C., App.
Div.) [hereinafter Isaac]; Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285 [hereinafter
Derrickson];Paul v. Paul,[1986] 1 S.C.R. 306 [hereinafterPaul]; Roberts v. Canada,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 322 at 338 [hereinafter Roberts]; Stoney Creek, supra note 17,
especially 206-10; Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 23 at paras. 476-81. Compare
Boyer v. Canada (1986), 65 N.R. 305 at 311 (F.C.A.) [hereinafterBoyer], leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused (1986), 72 N.R. 365n;Oka (Municipality)v. Simon, [1999] 2
C.N.L.R. 205 (Qc. C.A.) [hereinafter Oka], leave to appeal refused by the S.C.C.,
[2000] 1 C.N.L.R. iv. Obviously, provincial laws that aredirectedat s. 91(24) lands are
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laws that are primarily (or, in constitutional jargon, in "pith and
substance") in relation to some other provincial head of power can affect
s. 91(24) lands incidentally.5' Prior to a recent decision of the Quebec
Court of Appeal,52 judicial disagreement in this context was mainly over
whether a particular law should be characterized
as a law in relation to
53
land or in relation to some other matter.

ultra vires, and therefore of no effect whatsoever: seeHopton v. Pamajewon, [1994] 2
C.N.L.R. 61 at 70 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused,sub nom. Attorney-Generalfor
Ontariov. Pamajewon, [1994] 2 S.C.R. v;Delgamuukw, supra note I at 1122, Lamer
CJ.C.
51 See Francis,supra note 32; Rempel Brothers Concrete Ltd. v. Chilliwack (District)
(1994), 88 B.C.L.R1 (2d) 209 (C.A.);Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1122, Lamer C.J.C.
Note that while the cases on the application of provincial laws to s. 91(24) lands have
usually dealt with the issue in the context of Indian reserves, sinceDelgamuukw the
rules laid down in those cases are generally applicable to Aboriginal title lands as well
(except where the decisions were based on other constitutional provisions such as the
Natural Resources TransferAgreements,supranote 8, or on federal legislation, such as
the Indian Act, supranote 4). Lamer C.J.C. held not only that those lands are as much
under exclusive federal jurisdiction as Indian reserves, but also that the Aboriginal
interest in both kinds of s. 91(24) lands is the same. SeeDelgamuukv, supranote 1 at
1085 and 1116-18.
52 Oka, supra note 50, where it was held that possession and "Indian" use of s. 91(24)
lands are within the core of exclusive federal jurisdiction, but "general" use (in that
case, building an apartment block) that does not affect Indianness or Indian status is not.
This holding is in direct conflict with Peace Arch, supra note 50, with which the
Quebec Court of Appeal disagreed. Compare also the cases cited in note 53.
53 For example, in R. v. Fiddler, [1994] 1 C.N.L.R. 121 (Sask. Q.B.), it was held that the
Prairieand ForestFiresAct, 1982, S.S. 1982-83, c. P-22.1, appliespropriovigore to an
Indian who starts a fire on an Indian reserve in contravention of theAct, as starting a
fire does not relate to Indianness or amount to a use of the land. In Noble J.'s words at
127, the provision in question "is clearly a safety law." However, in R. v. Sinclair,
[1978] 6 W.W.R. 37 (Man. Prov. Ct.), the opposite conclusion was reached with respect
to equivalent Manitoba fire-prevention legislation. Similarly, inRe ParkMobile Homes
Sales Ltd. and Le Greely (1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 618 (B.C.C.A.) at 620 [hereinafter
Park Mobile Homes], Fan-is C.J.B.C., for the Court, held that a provision of the
Landlordand Tenant Act, 1974 (B.C.), c. 45, restricting the right of a landlord to raise
rent for residential premises, applies to rental of a mobile home pad on an Indian
reserve because "an increase in rent does not affect Indian lands or the use of Indian
lands"; whereas in Millbrook Indian Band v.Northern Counties Residential Tenancies
Board (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 174 (N.S.S.C.) [hereinafterMillbrook], affirmed on other
grounds, sub nom. Re Attorney-General of Nova Scotia and Millbrook Indian Band
(1978), 93 D.L.RL (3d) 230 (N.S.S.C. App. Div.), Morrison J. held at 181 that the
Residential Tenancies Act, 1970 (N.S.), c. 13, "basically is legislation dealing with the
management, use and control of land," and so does not apply on Indian reserves. For
discussion of the land use characterization issue, see P. Hughes, "Indians and Lands
Reserved for the Indians: Off-Limits to the Provinces?" (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall L.J. 82
at 97-103.
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If, as the weight of authority indicates, provincial laws of general
application with respect to land cannot apply of their own force to s.
91(24) lands, 54 are those laws referentially incorporated into federal55law
by s. 88? A long-standing body of case law has held that they are not.
In Isaac,56 for example, the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court held that provincial game laws affect the use of land, and
so cannot apply of their own force on Indian reserves. MacKeigan
C.J.N.S. put it this way:
To shoot a rabbit, deer or grouse on land especially Indian reserve land, is as
much a use of that land as to cut a tree on that land, or to mine minerals,
extract oil from the ground, or farm that land, or, as in the Peace Arch case

In this respect, s. 91(24) lands apparently enjoy the same kind of protection from
provincial laws as lands held by the Crown in right of Canada, over which Parliament
has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 2, s.
91 (1A) ("The Public Debt and Property"): see Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas
Conservation Board, [1933] S.C.R. 629 [hereinafter Spooner Oils]; Re Director of
Soldier Settlement of Canada (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 94 (Sask. Q.B.);Delta v. Aztec
Aviation Group (1985), 28 M.P.L.R. 215 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Delta]; Canadian
Occidental Petroleum Ltd. v. North Vancouver (Dist.) (1986), 13 B.C.L.R. 34 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Canadian Occidental];InternationalAviation Terminals Ltd. v. Richmond
(Township) (1992), 89 D.L.R. (4h) I (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused
(1992), 94 D.L.R. ( 4U0) vii [hereinafter InternationalAviation]; Mississauga (City) v.
Greater Toronto Airports Authority, [2000] O.J. No. 4086 (Ont. C.A.), online: QL (OJ).
[hereinafter Greater Toronto Airports]; compare Oka, supra note 50. I am grateful to
Kerry Wilkins for many of these references.
In addition to the cases discussed in the text, seeR. v. Johns (1962), 39 W.W.R. 49

56

(Sask. C.A.) at 53; Palm DairiesLtd. v. The Queen (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 665 at 670
(F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Palm Dairies]; Park Mobile Homes, supra note 53 at 619;
Millbrook, supra note 53 at 181-3; The Queen v. Smith (1980), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 522 at
571 (F.C.A.), reversed without mention of s. 88, [1983] S.C.R. 554;Reference re Stony
Plain Indian Reserve No. 135 (1981), 130 D.L.R. (3d) 636 at 653-55 (Alta. C.A.)
[hereinafter Stony Plain];Stoney Creek, supranote 17 at 201-05; Chippevas of Sarnia,
supra note 23 at paras. 491-95. In other cases, provincial laws in relation to land have
been found to be inapplicable to Indian reserves without reference to s. 88: seee.g.
Peace Arch, supranote 50 (either it did not occur to anyone to raise s. 88, or the section
was thought to be inapplicable). Moreover, academic commentary generally supports
the interpretation that s. 88 does not make provincial laws in relation to land apply to s.
91(24) lands: see e.g. K. Lysyk, "The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian
Indian" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 513 at 518, 552; Hughes,supra note 53 at 97; B.
Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 779-81;
Little Bear, supra note 12 at 187; R.A. Reiter, The Law of First Nations (Edmonton:
Juris Analytica, 1996) at 201. See also Hon. Mr. Justice D. Lambert, 'Van der Peet and
Delgamuukw: Ten Unresolved Issues" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 249 at 266.
Supra note 50.
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[supra note 50], erect a building on that land-all of which are activities

57
unquestionably exclusively for the federal government to regulate.

Moreover, provincial game laws are not referentially incorporated into
federal law by s. 88 where Indian hunting occurs on reserve lands
because, in the words of MacKeigan,
[s]ection 88 merely declares that valid provincial laws of general application
to residents of a province apply also to Indians in the province. It does not
make applicable to Indian reserve land a provincial game law which would
have the effect of regulating use of that land by Indians. It does not enlarge the
constitutional scope of the provincial law which is limited by the federal
exclusivity of power respecting such land.5
The Isaac decision is consistent with dicta in Cardinalv. Attorney
General of Alberta,59 decided by the Supreme Court two years earlier.
That case also involved the application of provincial game laws on an
Indian reserve. The Court held that those laws apply to Indians on
reserves in Alberta by virtue of s. 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer
Agreement,60 subject to exceptions contained therein. After referring to
5

Ibid. at 469. See also R. v. Paul and Copage (1977), 35 A.P.R. 313 (N.S.S.C. App.
Div.); R. v. Julian (1978), 40 A.P.R. 156 (N.S.S.C. App. Div.). CompareR. v. Smith,
[1942] 3 D.L.R 764 (Ont. C.A.), deciding that provisions of theGame and Fisheries
Act, R.S.O. 1937, c. 353, applied to hunting on the Petawawa Military Camp Reserve,

title to which is in the Crown in right of Canada. Robertson C.J.O., for the Court, said at
766: "The Game and FisheriesAct-in any event such part of it as is relevant here-is
not concerned with land. Its purpose is the protection of wild game and of fish, and its
prohibitions are directed against persons within the Province, and their conduct."
However, Robertson C.J.O. pointed out on the same page that the accused officer, "in
doing the acts complained of, was not performing any military duty, nor otherwise
acting in the service of the Crown, nor with its authority or permission."Smith was
followed in R. v. Harti, R. v. Stewart (1979), 94 D.L.R. (3d) 461 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.)
[hereinafter Hart],and cited with approval by Beetz J. in ConstructionMontcalm Inc.
v. The Minimum Wage Commission, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 754 at 778 [hereinafter

Construction Montcalm]. However, given the importance of hunting for Aboriginal
peoples, and the integral part it generally plays in their cultural connections with the
land, cases involving the application of provincial game laws on federal lands like
military camps are clearly distinguishable from cases like Isaac, supra note 50. For
further discussion, see K. McNeil, Indian Hunting, Trappingand Fishing Rights in the

PrairieProvinces of Canada (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law
Centre, 1983) at 14-17. See also the text accompanying note 66.
sa

Isaac, supra note 50 at 474. In Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1089, Lamer C.J.C.

appears to have accepted that hunting by Aboriginal people is a use of land, as he
suggested that occupation of land for the purpose of proving Aboriginal title could be
"established with reference to the use of the land as a hunting ground" [emphasis

added]; see also at 1101.
59

Supranote 50.

6o

Schedule (2) to the ConstitutionAct, 1930, supranote 8. Section 12 provides:
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two earlier decisions holding that provincial game laws do not apply to
Indians on reserves, 6 1Martland J., for the majority, wrote:
In my opinion, the meaning of s. 12 is that Canada, clothed as it was with
legislative jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians," in
order to achieve the purpose of the section, agreed to the imposition of
Provincial controls over hunting and 62fishing, which, previously, the Province
might not have hadpower to impose.

Martland then relied on the express words of s. 12 that the game laws
of the Province shall apply "to the Indians within the boundaries
thereof' 63 to conclude that "this must contemplate their application to all
Indians within the Province, without restriction as to where, within the
Province, they might be." 64 Having reached this conclusion, Martland
found it unnecessary to consider the effect of s. 88 of the Indian Act.
Laskin J. (Hall and Spence JJ. concurring) dissented. Referring to s.
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, he wrote: "Apart entirely from the
exclusive power vested in the Parliament of Canada to legislate in relation
to Indians, its exclusive power in relation also to Indian Reserves puts
such tracts of land, albeit they are physically in a Province, beyond
provincial competence to regulate their use or to control resources
thereon., 65 He went on to observe that the "present case concerns the
regulation and administration of the resources of land comprised in a
reserve, and I can conceive of nothing more integral to that land as
such. 66 So Laskin, as MacKeigan C.J.N.S. held in Isaac and Martland J.

6'

In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply of
game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws
respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians
within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians shall have the
fight, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping and fishing
game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and
on any other lands to which the said Indians may have a right of access.
R. v. Jim (1915), 26 C.C.C. 236 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafterJim]; R. v. Rodgers, [1923] 2
W.W.R. 353 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter Rodgers].

62

Cardinal,supra note 50 at 708 [emphasis added].

63

Ibid.

6' Ibid. In Harit,supra note 57, the Court relied on Cardinal,supranote 50, to conclude

that provincial game laws apply on federal military bases, without mentioning the fact
that Martland J. relied specifically on the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement in
reaching his conclusion that the provincial game law in question applied on Indian
reserves in Alberta. In my respectful opinion, the Court in Hartt misapplied Cardinal.
65

Cardinal,supra note 50 at 715.

6

Ibid. at 717. See also Chouinard J.'s statement inDerrickson,supra note 50 at 296,
where he said for a unanimous Court that the "right to possession of lands on an Indian
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suggested might be the case,67 was of the view that provincial game laws
could not apply on reserves of their own force. Laskin then turned to s. 12
of the NaturalResources Transfer Agreement, and concluded that it did
not have the effect of making those laws apply on reserves (this was the
basis for his dissent). Having reached that conclusion, Laskin (unlike
Martland J.) had to consider whether s. 88 of the Indian Act had that
effect. He found that it did not, for two reasons:
The section deals only with Indians, not with Reserves, and is, in any event, a
referential incorporation of provincial legislation which takes effect under the
section as federal legislation.... If the Wildlife Act of Alberta is such an
enactment as is envisaged by s. 88, an Indian who violated its terms would be
of an offence under federal law and not of an offence under provincial
guilty
68
law.
Laskin's first reason-that s. 88 "deals only with Indians, not with
Reserves"-has in fact been the main argument for not using the section
to apply provincial laws relating to land on reserves. The argument is
usually linked to s. 91(24). In Derrickson, Chouinard J., in a unanimous
judgment, put it this way:
The submission that s. 88 does not apply to lands reserved for Indians is quite
simple. It is to the effect that not one but two subject matters are the object of
s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, namely: "Indians" and "Lands
in s. 88, that
reserved for the Indians." Since only Indians are mentioned
69
section would not apply to lands reserved for the Indians.
That case involved the a~plication of provisions of the British
Columbia Family Relations Act relating to the division of property upon
the breakdown of a marriage on a reserve. Chouinard J. held that those
provisions could not apply of their own force to reserve lands because
reserve is manifestly of the very essence of the federal exclusive legislative power under
s. 91(24)." In Delgamuukw, supra note I at 1083 (and elsewhere in his judgment),
Lamer C.J.C. linked use and possession of s. 91(24) lands by describing Aboriginal title
(which he equated with the Indian interest in reserves) as "the right to exclusive use and
occupation of the land." Moreover, in Paul, supra note 50, the Court refused to
distinguish between occupation and possession in the context of exclusive federal
jurisdiction over reserve lands.
67 See quotation accompanying note 62.Martland J. referred to but did not overruleJim
and Rodgers, supranote 61, both of which held that exclusive federal jurisdiction under
s. 91(24) prevents provincial game laws from applying to Indians on reserves.
68 Cardinal,supranote 50 at 727-28.
69 Derrickson,supra note 50 at 298. Note that the interpretation that s. 91(24) contains two
distinct heads of power was accepted by the Supreme Court inFourB Manufacturing,
supra note 32 at 1049-50.
70 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121.
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possession of those lands is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction
under s. 91(24).71 He then had to address the question of whether s. 88
referentially incorporated those provisions, which led him to ask,
"Does s.
' 72
88 of the IndianAct Apply to Lands Reserved for the Indians?
Unfortunately, Chouinard J. was able to avoid answering this question
because he found a direct conflict between the relevant provisions of the
Family Relations Act and the Indian Act. Since both acts deal with
possession of lands in ways that are not compatible, and the doctrine of
federal paramountcy applies in the event of operational conflict between
federal and provincial laws, the provisions of the Indian Act prevail where
reserve lands are concerned. This is especially so because s. 88 itself
excludes the application of provincial laws "that are inconsistent with this
Act." As a result, we still do not have a definitive ruling from the
Supreme Court on the issue of whether s. 88, assuming its constitutionally
has not been affected by the enactment of s. 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct,
1982, makes provincial laws of general application apply to reserve lands.
Also left open is the question of whether the section makes those laws
apply to other s. 91(24) lands, in particular Aboriginal title lands.
IV.

ASSESSING THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE
APPLICATION OF SECTION 88 TO SECTION 91(24) LANDS

In Derrickson, Chouinard J.quoted the following argument that favoured
the referential incorporation of provincial laws relating to land by s. 88,
presented on behalf of the intervening Attorney General of Ontario:
The purpose and effect of section 88 is to limit the applicability to Indians of
provincial laws of general application by enacting that such laws are "subject
to the terms of any treaty" and subject to the expanded doctrine of federal
paramountcy set out in the section. Pursuant to its legislative authority under
section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, Parliament has enacted, in
section 88 of the Indian Act, law concerning the exposure of Indians to "all
laws of general application from time to time in force in any province." It
makes no difference whether those laws are in relation to lands or some other
class of subjects. In either event, they are applicable to Indians subject to the
limits prescribed in the section. There is no reason to import into the
construction of the words in section 88 the fact that Parliament has, pursuant
73
to section 91(24), not one but two subjects within its legislative authority.

71

See note 66.

72 Derrickson,supra note 50

at 297.

73 Ibid. at 299 [emphasis in original]. See also P.J. Monahan and A. Petter, "Developments

in Constitutional Law: The 1985-86 Term" (1987) 9 Supreme Court L. Rev. 69 at 16970, for a similar argument.
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The first part of this argument is simply wrong, given the decision in
Dick,74 handed down just one week before Derrickson was argued before
the Court. In the former case, the Court decided that the effect of s. 88 is
to referentially incorporate provincial laws of general application that
would not otherwise apply to Indians because they touch on the core of
Indianness that is under the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on Parliament
by s. 91(24). 7 5 So, contrary to the Attorney General's argument, the
purpose and effect of s. 88 was not to limit, but to indirectly expand,
provincial jurisdiction through the mechanism of referential
incorporation. 76
The second part of the Attorney General's argument deserves more
attention. As I understand it, its thrust is that Indians are made subject to
provincial laws of general application, subject to the exceptions in s. 88,
whether or not their activities are in relation to land or some other matter.
It was therefore unnecessary for s. 88 to refer to lands reserved for the
Indians as well as to Indians in order for provincial laws relating to land
to be made applicable to Indians on reserves. While this argument may
appear attractive at first glance, closer examination reveals serious
weaknesses.
First, the term "Indians," as used in s. 88, refers only to those persons
who fall within the definition of that term in the Indian Act, namely
persons registered or entitled to be registered as Indians, or (for more
limited purposes) those who are entered or entitled to be entered on a
Band List.7 Persons entitled to be registered are defined by complex rules
principally set out in ss. 6 and 7 (as amended). As pointed out by
Professor Douglas Sanders, if the argument of the Attorney General of
Ontario in Derrickson is correct, the result would be that provincial laws
in relation to land would apply to Indians falling within the Indian Act
statutory definition, but would not apply to other persons holding or using
s. 91(24) lands.78 This cannot be correct, as it leads to the absurd result
that non-Indians holding or using those lands are protected against
74

Supra note 5.

75 See also Delgamuukw, supra note I at 1121-22.
76 See also NaturalParents,supranote 32 at 763, Laskin C.J.C., quoted with approval in
Dick, supra note 5 at 327, Beetz J., and Bell Canada, supranote 32 at 836. However, to
be fair to counsel for the Attorney General one must realize that they would not have
bad time to change their factum after the Dick decision was handed down.
'n Indian Act, supra note 4, ss. 2(1), 4.1. See Alphonse, supra note 15 at 420, Macfarlane

J.A., at 443-45, Lambert J.A.
78 D. Sanders, "The Constitution, the Provinces, and Aboriginal Peoples," in J.A. Long
and M. Boldt, eds., Governments in Conflict? Provinces and Indian Nations in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 151 at 287 note 14.

UJ.B.C. LAW REVIEW

VOL. 34:1

provincial laws by s. 91(24) while Indian Act Indians, as a consequence of
s. 88, are not. 79 Put another way, the Attorney General's argument would
have us believe that s. 88 transforms provincial laws in relation to land
(regardless of who holds or uses it, which is necessary for those laws to
be of general application 8°) into personal laws applicableonly to Indian
Act Indians where s. 91(24) lands are concerned.8 ' Surely Parliament
79

Note that the case law on whether provincial laws relating to land applyoftheir own
force to persons on reserves who are not within the statutory definition of Indian is
inconsistent and confusing. CompareR. v. Morley, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.C.A.)
(provincial game laws apply to a non-Indian hunting on a reserve), and Western
Industrial ContractorsLtd. v. Sarcee Developments Ltd. (1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 424
(Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter Western Industrial] (provincial builders' lien legislation
applies to a leasehold held by a corporation on a reserve but not to an Indian band's
reversionary interest), with Peace Arch, supra note 50 (municipal zoning laws and
building codes and provincial health laws that relate to the use of land do not apply to
non-Indian lessees of reserve land), and Palm Dairies, supra note 55 (provincial
builders' lien legislation does not apply to a leasehold held by a non-Indian on a
reserve). In Cardinal,supra note 50 at 719, Laskin J. (dissenting) said that "it appears to
me that the decision in Surrey v. Peace Arch Enterprises undermines the majority
judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Rex v. Morley." However,
Martland J., for the majority in Cardinal,said at 704 that "the situation was different" in
those two cases. While this issue is too complex to be dealt with adequately here, it
seems to me that, s. 88 aside, distinctions in the application of provincial laws to reserve
lands based on whether the land holder or user is an Indian or not are suspect, given
exclusive federal jurisdiction over "[lands reserved for the Indians." As Beetz J. said in
another context in FourB Manufacturing,supra note 32 at 1049-50, s. 91(24)
assigns jurisdiction to Parliament over two distinct subject matters, Indians and
Lands reserved for the Indians, not Indians on Lands reserved for the Indians. The
power of Parliament to make laws in relation to Indians is the same whether Indians
are on a reserve or off a reserve. It is not reinforced because it is exercised over
Indians on a reserve any more than it is weakened because it is exercised over Indians
off a reserve. [emphasis in original]

It would seem to follow from this that federal jurisdiction over "[l]ands reserved for the
Indians" is neither reinforced because the person using or holding the land is an Indian,
nor weakened because that person is a non-Indian.The apparently anomalous decision
in Western Industrialcan be explained by applying real property principles toseparate
the leasehold and reversion into distinct estates, and then excluding the leasehold from
the scope of s. 91 (24) on the basis that, unlike the reversion, it is not landreservedfor
the Indians. However, even when rationalized in this way, Western Industrial is still
inconsistent with Peace Arch and Palm Dairies. It is also difficult to reconcile with
Spooner Oils, Delta, CanadianOccidental,InternationalAviation, and Greater Toronto
Airports, supra note 54, all of which held that provincial laws affecting use of land do
not apply to lessees of lands that are owned by the Crown in right of CanadaSee also
Stony Plain, supra note 55 at 652-53; McNeil, supra note 8 at 459 note 131.
80 See Kruger,supra note 14 at 110, Dickson J.: for a law to beof general application, it
must "extend uniformly throughout the territory" and "must not be 'in relation to' one
class of citizens in object and purpose."
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cannot have intended82 the section to have this remarkable-and
discriminatory-effect.
Secondly, we have seen that the main argument againstapplying s. 88
to s. 91(24) lands is that the latter section contains two heads of power,
not one, and that s. 88 would have mentioned "[lands reserved for the
Indians" as well as "Indians" if it was intended to make provincial laws
applicable in both fields of federal jurisdiction. We have seen that the
Attorney General of Ontario's response to this was that "[tfhere is no
reason to import into the construction of the words in section 88 the fact
that Parliament has, pursuant to section 91(24), not one but two subjects
within its legislative authority., 8 3 But in fact there is ample reason to do
so. It has to be kept in mind that what we are discussing here is, in effect,
a very serious extension of provincial authority into exclusive federal
jurisdiction by referential incorporation of both existing and future
provincial laws.8 4 Given the impact of this on Indians as defined in the
Indian Act, to whom the federal government has fiduciary obligations and
Thus, if the Minister of Indian Affairs authorized a non-Indian to occupy or use reserve

82

land, as the Minister is empowered to do by s. 28(2) of theIndian Act (see text
accompanying note 105, and Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R.
119), that person would not be subject to provincial laws in relation to land but his or
her Indian neighbour would be. See also Stoney Creek, supra note 17 at 205, where
Lysyk J. pointed out that there is "a difference in kind between laws relating to Indians
as a class of persons and laws relating to their lands. As reflected in the cases, the
former category embraces (although it is not confined to)regulation of their activities
on or off a reserve. The latter category, in contrast, has to do with the right toexclusive
use and benefit of the land itself' [emphasis added]. This passage was adopted and
applied by Campbell J. in Chippewas of Sarnia,supranote 23 at para. 493.
Furthermore, if this part of the Attorney General's argument were applied to s. 91(24)
itself, the inclusion of "[ljands reserved for the Indians" would seem to have been
unnecessary, as federal jurisdiction over "Indians" would have authorized Parliament to
enact legislation in relation to Indian land holding and use without an express conferral
of jurisdiction over Indian lands as such. Slatterysupra note 55, in his rejection of the
Ontario Attorney General's argument at 780-81, made a similar point:

83

...
lands held by Indians as ordinary citizens are subject to the general laws of the
province, so that they must conform for example to local building and health
requirements. But it does not follow that section 88 makes provincial laws applicable
to the special category of lands reserved for the Indians. That conclusion would
follow only if such lands did not constitute a distinct constitutional subject-matter,
but were simply subsumed under "Indians." As it is,Parliament'spower to legislate
for Indian lands does not flow from its jurisdiction over Indians. So Parliament's
decision to make provincial laws of general application applicable to Indians leaves
the subject-matter of Indian lands untouched. [emphasis added, footnotes omitted]
Derrickson, supranote 50 at 299 [emphasis added]. See also Wilkins,supra note 22 at
483-97.

84

See Little Bear, supra note 12 at 183-87; Ryder, supra note 12 at 375-76.
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constitutional responsibilities, 85 one would expect Parliament to express
itself clearly if it intended to authorize the intrusion of provincial laws
into both heads of s. 91(24) power. By mentioning only one, surely
Parliament
intended to exclude the other, as expressio unius est exclusio
86
alterius.
Interpreting s. 88 to exclude s. 91(24) land from the reach of
referentially incorporated provincial laws "also accords with the principle
that statutes relating to Indians should be construed liberally and doubtful
expressions resolved in their favour., 8 7 The application of provincial laws
in relation to land to s. 9(24) lands would probably have a generally
negative impact on the Indian nations for whom those lands are reserved,
particularly where self-government is concerned. 8 So if s. 88 contains
8

86

See Guerin, supra note 19; Sparrow, supra note 7; Blueberry River Indian Band v.
Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 S.C.R.
344 [hereinafter Blueberry River]; Delgamuukw, supra note 1. See also notes 36, 48,
and the accompanying text.
This maxim of statutory interpretation, which translates as mention of one excludes
another, is referred to in Ruth Sullivan,Driedgeron the Construction of Statutes, 2nd
ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 168, as a canon of "implied exclusion." The author
describes its application as follows:
An implied exclusion argument lies whenever there is reason to believe that if the
legislature had meant to include a particular thing within the ambit of its legislation,
it would have referred to that thing expressly. Because of this expectation, the
legislature's failure to mention the thing becomes grounds for inferring that it was
deliberately excluded. Although there is no express exclusion, exclusion is implied.
The force of the implication depends on the strength and legitimacy of the
expectation of express reference. The better the reason for anticipating express
reference to a thing, the more telling the silence of the legislature.[emphasis added]

See also P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the InterpretationofStatutes, 12th ed. (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1976) at 293-97; F.A.R. Bennion,Statutory Interpretation:A Code,
3rd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1997) at 969-76.
87 Slattery, supra note 55 at 780. E.g. see R. v. Nowegifick, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29 at 36;
Simon, supra note 13 at 402; Sparrow,supra note 7 at 1107-08;Mitchell,supranote 36
at 142-43, La Forest J., and at 98-100, Dickson C.J.C. Note that this principle of
statutory interpretation is supported by the more general rule that legislation is to be
construed, if at all possible, so as not to impair accrued rights or existing status: see
Spooner Oils, supra note 54 at 638; Attorney-Generalfor Canada v.Hallet & Carey
Ld., [1952] A.C. 427 at 450 (P.C.). For more detailed discussion, see McNeil,supra
note 8 at 438-40.
See Little Bear, supra note 12 at 187; Slattery, supra note 27 at 285 (see the passage
quoted in the text accompanying note 28).Compare Wilkins, supra note 22 at 491-92.
While one can envisage provincial legislation that might be generally beneficial to
persons defined as Indians by the Indian Act, such as a statute offering financial
assistance for the improvement of homes on condition that the improvements are of a
certain nature and meet provincial standards, it is questionable whether such a statute
(assuming that it is in relation to land, and therefore not applicable of its own force to
homes on s. 91(24) lands) could be referentially incorporated by federal legislation, as
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ambiguity in this regard (which I do not think it does), that ambiguity
should be resolved so that the section does not make provincial laws in
relation to land apply to s. 91(24) lands.
Other arguments in support of this position are based on the
exclusions contained in s. 88 with respect to the application of provincial
laws to Indians.89 First of all, the application of those laws is subject to
"the terms of any treaty." This exception has been applied by the Supreme
Court to exclude the application of provincial game laws to treaty rights
to engage in hunting,90 which we have seen has been judicially regarded
as an Aboriginal use of land.91 More relevant still in the present context is
the Sioui 92 case, which involved treaty rights to practise customs and
religious rites within a certain territory in the province of Quebec. The
accused were Hurons whom Lamer J., delivering the judgment of the
Supreme Court, described as "Indians within the meaning of the Indian
Act.193 They had been camping, cutting trees, and making fires in
Jacques-Cartier Park, and were charged with violating provisions of the
94
Regulation respecting the Parc de la Jacques-Cartier.
Lamer held that
the Regulation did not apply to them because they had been practising
treaty rights that were protected from provincial laws by s. 88. Given the
nature of the activities the accused had been engaged in when they were
charged, those rights obviously involved use of the land.
Sioui and the treaty hunting cases show that treaty rights in relation to
land are protected by s. 88 against infringement and regulation by
Parliament probably does not have the constitutional authority to impose financial
obligations on the provinces by unilaterally incorporating their laws into federal law.
For analogous cases, see Reference re: Troops in Cape Breton, [1930] S.C.IR 554;
RegionalMunicipality ofPeel v.MacKenzie, [1982] 2 S.C.tR 9; compareReference re:

Goods and Services Tax, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 445 (I am grateful to Kerry Wilkins for these
references). Other provincial laws, such as the Family Relations Act considered in
Derrickson, supra note 50, would promote broader societal goals and benefit some
persons, but at the expense of Indian autonomy: see RtH. Bartlett, "Indian SelfGovernment, the Equality of the Sexes, and the Application of Provincial Matrimonial
Property Laws" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 188; M.E. Turpel, "Home/Land" (1991) 10
Can. J. Fam. L. 17.
89 For detailed discussion of the exclusions, see Wilkins, supranote 22 at 472-501.
90 See R. v. White and Bob (1964), 50 D.L.Rt (2d) 613 (B.C.C.A.), aff'd (1965), 52 D.L.R.
(2d) 481n (S.C.C.); Simon, supra note 13; Sundown, supra note 26 at 418. See also
C6t6, supranote 8,involving fishing rights.
91 See notes 57-58, 65-66, and the accompanying text.
92 Supra note 13.

" Ibid. at 1031.
9

O.I.C. 3108-81, 113 O.G.II. 3518 (ParksAct,RLS.Q. 1977, c. P-9).
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inconsistent provincial laws. The importance of this to the argument that
s. 88 does not make provincial laws apply to s. 91(24) lands is that, in the
treaty areas of Canada, Indian reserves were usually created by or
pursuant to the terms of a treaty. Treaty 6, signed in 1876 and covering a
large area now within the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta, can be
used as an example. It provides: "And Her Majesty the Queen hereby
agrees and undertakes to lay aside reserves for farming lands, due respect
being had to lands at present cultivated by the said Indians, and other
reserves for the benefit of the said Indians, to be administered and dealt
with for them by Her Majesty's Government of the Dominion of
Canada.""5 Where reserves were created pursuant to the terms of a treaty
like this, the Indian right of use and possession of lands within the
reserves is a treaty right, just as the practice of customs and religious rites
within the territory frequented by the Hurons was held to be a treaty right
in Sioui. This means that provincial laws that regulate or otherwise
interfere with that right of use and possession would be inconsistent with
the terms of the treaty, in the same way as the provincial Regulation in
Sioui was inconsistent with the free exercise of the customs and religious
rites of the Hurons. As a result, to the extent that provincial laws of
general application in relation to land would interfere with the use and
possession of lands on reserves created by or pursuant to a treaty, they
cannot be referentially incorporated by s. 88.
If provincial laws in relation to land were made applicable to reserve
lands by s. 88, an anomalous situation would therefore result. Because the
section makes the application of provincial laws incorporated by it subject
to the terms of treaties, reserves created by or pursuant to a treaty would
enjoy a large measure of protection against provincial laws, whereas
reserves created without a treaty would not. In British Columbia, for
example, this would mean that reserves created pursuant to Treaty 8 in the
north-eastern part of the province would have greater immunity from
provincial laws than reserves elsewhere that were not based on treaty.
Surely Parliament did not intend to make reserve lands within the same
province subject to different legal regimes in this way when it enacted
what is now s. 88 in 1951.
Section 88 contains other exceptions to the application of provincial
laws as well. First of all, it provides that federal statutes generally
9

Treaty 6, in A. Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the
North-West Territories (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke & Co., 1880) 351 at 352-53. Note
that, in the case of Treaty 6, the provision for reserves "to be administered and dealt
with for them by Her Majesty's Government of the Dominion of Canada" provides
additional support for the argument I am making, as it can be regarded as an
undertaking to maintainfederal control. However, as an equivalent provision was not
included in all the treaties, it cannot be relied upon generally for this purpose.
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continue to be paramount. But more importantly for our purposes, it also
provides that provincial laws apply "except to the extent that those laws
are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation, or by-law
made thereunder, and except to the extent that those laws make provision
for any matter for which provision is made by or under this Act." 96 This
not only maintains paramountcy in the event of direct conflict with the
Indian Act and orders, etc., made under it, but also means that the Act and
those orders, etc., can exclude provincial laws simply by occupying the
field. In R. v. Peters,97 the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal accordingly
held that a provision in the Yukon Liquor Ordinance98 prohibiting
consumption of alcohol by a minor did not apply to an Indian because the
Indian Act's liquor provisions (since repealed) occupied the field.
Macfarlane J.A., for a unanimous Court, said this:
It is true that the Indian Act does not make specific provision for the offence
with which the respondent was charged, namely, consuming liquor, being
under the age of 21 years. It may be that in considering whether a provincial
or territorial law is inconsistent with the Indian Act it would be necessary to
compare the respective enactments in specific detail. I am of the opinion,
however, that the second exception "the extent that such laws make provision
for any matter for which provision is made by or under this Act" should be
given a broadand liberal interpretationin order to give effect to the intention
of parliament which has clearly made provision, by the Indian Act, for the
matter of the use and possession of intoxicants by Indians. The relevant

provision of the Yukon Liquor Ordinance, being within the meaning of the
stated in sec. 87 [now s. 88], is accordingly not applicable to
second exception
99
Indians.

If the liquor provisions of the Indian Act relating to "the use and
possession of intoxicants by Indians" occupied the field sufficiently to
exclude provincial and territorial liquor laws, that Act's provisions and
regulations relating to use and possession of land might do the same thing
where provincial land laws are concerned. We therefore need to take a
96 Indian Act, supra note 4, s. 88.
97 (1966), 57 W.W.t. 727 [hereinafterPeters].
9' Y.1.O. 1958, c. 67.

99 Peters, supra note 97 at 730 [emphasis added]. See also infra note 121; R. v. Shade
(1952), 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 430 (Aia. Dist. Ct.);R. v. Pawis, [1972] 2 O.R. 516 (Dist.
CL); compare R. v. Bear (1968), 63 W.W.R. 754 (Sask. Dist. Ct.) (s. 88 was not referred
to); Re Williams Estate (1960), 32 W.W.R. 686 (B.C.S.C.). For discussion, see Lysyk,
supra note 55 at 545-49; Hughes, supra note 53 at 93-97. Note that Macfarlane J.'s
"broad and liberal interpretation" approach to s. 88 has since been applied by the
Supreme Court on many occasions in the context of interpretation of statutory
provisions relating to Indians: see note 87 and the accompanying text.
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closer look at the Indian Act and its regulations to determine to what
extent the field has been occupied where reserve lands are concerned. 0 0
Sections 18 to 41 of the Act deal specifically with reserve lands,
providing for such matters as beneficial use (s. 18), surveys and
subdivisions (s. 19), possession (ss. 20-21 and 24-27), improvements (ss.
22-23), non-band member occupation and use (s. 28), exemption from
seizure (s. 29), trespass (ss. 30-31), disposition of agricultural produce (ss.
32-33), roads and bridges (s. 34), expropriation (s. 35), special reserves (s.
36), and surrenders (ss. 37-41).10 Some of these sections deserve special
attention. Section 18(1) provides:
Subject to this Act, reserves are held by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of
the respective bands for which they were set apart, and subject to this Act and
to the terms of any treaty or surrender, the Governor in Council may
determine whether any purpose for which lands in a reserve are used or are to
be used is for the use and benefit of the band.10 2
Subsection 2 of s. 18 goes on to empower the Minister of Indian
Affairs to authorize the use of reserve lands for various purposes, such as
Indian schools, burial grounds, and health projects, "or, with the consent
of the council of the band, for any other purpose for the general welfare of
the band."'' 0 3 Section 20(1) stipulates: "No Indian is lawfully in
possession of land in a reserve unless, with the approval of the Minister,
possession of the land has been allocated to him by the council of the
band."

04

Section 28 provides:

(1) Subject to subsection (2), any deed, lease, contract, instrument, document
or agreement of any kind, whether written or oral, by which a band or a
member of a band purports to permit a person other than a member of that
band to occupy or use a reserve or to reside or otherwise exercise any rights
on a reserve is void.

100 Where a particular reserve is concerned, it would also be necessary to look at
regulations, orders, rules and by-laws which apply specifically to that reserve, but this
kind of detailed examination is beyond the scope of this article.
'1' Other provisions relate to reserve lands as well: e.g. ss. 42-50 (testate and intestate
succession), s. 53 (management of and transactions involving surrendered and
designated lands), s. 58 (improvement and cultivation of lands), s. 60 (grant of right to
control and manage reserve lands to bands), s. 71 (operation of farms), and s. 89
(prohibition of charge, seizure, mortgage etc. of reserve lands except in favour of
Indians or bands).
102 Indian Act, supranote 4, s. 18(1).
103

Ibid., s. 18(2).

104

Ibid.,s.20(l).
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(2) The Minister may by permit in writing authorize any person for a period
not exceeding one year, or with the consent of the council of the band for any
longer period, to occupy
or use a reserve or to reside or otherwise exercise
5
rights on a reserve.
So the Indian Act makes extensive provision for the use and
possession of reserve lands. Moreover, all the sections referred to above
were either already in the Indian Act when it was revised in 1951, or were
added at that time along with what is now s. 88.06
It is highly unlikely that Parliament intended provincial laws in
relation to the use and possession of land to be made applicable to reserve
lands by s. 88, when other sections of the Act made specific provision for
those matters. This interpretation is supported by s. 35(1), which
provides:
Where by an Act of the Parliament or a provinciallegislature Her Majesty in
right of a province, a municipal or local authority or a corporation is
empowered to take or to use lands or any interest therein without the consent
of the owner, the power may, with the consent of the Governor in Council and
subject to any terms that may be prescribed by the Governor in Council, be
exercised in relation to lands in a reserve or any interest therein. 0 7
This section specifically makes provincial expropriation laws apply to
reserve lands, subject to the consent of the Governor in Council. So where
Parliament intended to referentially incorporate provincial laws in relation
to land, it did not hesitate to do so expressly.
The key section respecting use of reserve lands is s. 18.'0'
Significantly, it was added to the Indian Act in 1951 at the same time as
the present s. 88.109 In Guerin, ° Wilson J. said this about s. 18:
los Ibid., s. 28.

o6 While not all these sections were exactly the same in 1951, most of the modifications
made since have been relatively minor, and do not affect the point being made here.
Indian Act, supra note 4, s. 35(l) [emphasis added]. Note that any expropriation of
reserve lands that had been set apart by or pursuant to a treaty, or that are subject to
Aboriginal title, would involve infringement of treaty or Aboriginal rights that are
protected by s. 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982. Accordingly, for the infringement to
be valid it would have to be justified under theSparrow test: see note 7. Also, it is
questionable whether referential incorporation ofprovincial expropriation laws by s.
35(1) of the Indian Act can ever be justified where an infringement would take place,
given the problems involved in applying the justification test in the context of
referential incorporation: see discussion of this issue in relation to s. 88 in notes 34-49
and the accompanying text. Moreover, if expropriation amounts to extinguishment of
Aboriginal or treaty rights, it cannot be justified: see R.v. Van derPeet, [1996] 2 S.C.R.
507 at 538, Lamer C.J.C.
108 Section 18(1) is quoted in the text accompanying note 102.
1o7

'09 Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29, s. 18(1).
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I think that when s. 18 mandates that reserves be held by the Crown for the
use and benefit of the Bands for which they are set apart, this is more than just
an administrative direction to the Crown. I think it is the acknowledgment of a
historic reality, namely that Indian Bands have a beneficial interest in their
reserves and that the Crown has a responsibility to protect that interest and
make sure that any purpose to which reserve land is put will not interfere with
it.1''
Wilson J. went on to make this responsibility legally enforceable by
holding that "the Crown has a fiduciary obligation to the Indian Bands
with respect to the uses to which reserve land may be put.""I1 2 Section 18,
she said, "is a statutory acknowledgement of that obligation.""' 3 Included
in it is "a fiduciary obligation to protect and preserve the Bands' interests
from invasion or destruction."'1 4 If one purpose of s. 18 was to
acknowledge the historic reality that the Crown (which from the context
is obviously the Crown in right of Canada) has a legally enforceable
responsibility to protect the interests of the Indian Bands in their reserve
lands, by enacting s. 88 at the same time Parliament can hardly have
intended to undermine that protection by making reserve lands subject to
provincial laws that could infringe those interests. This is consistent with
Chief Justice Lamer's statement in Delgamuukw that "the explicit
reference to treaty rights in s. 88 suggests that
the provision was clearly
' 15
not intended to undermine aboriginal rights."
Moreover, in Delgamuukw Lamer also relied on s. 18 to support his
conclusion that "[t]he nature of the Indian interest in reserve land is very

"0 Supra note 19.
1 Ibid.at 349 [emphasis added], See also Roberts, supranote 50 at 335-36, 340.
112 Guerin, supra note 19 at 349.
13

Ibid.

Ibid. at 350. Note that Ritchie and McIntyre JJ. participated in Wilson J.'s judgment.
Dickson J., delivering the judgment of Beetz, Chouinard, Lamer JJ. and himself,
reached the same result as Wilson. Regarding s. 18, Dickson said at 383-84, "Through
the confirmation in the Indian Act of the historic responsibility which the Crown has
undertaken, to act on behalf of the Indians so as to protect their interests in transactions
with third parties, Parliament has conferred upon the Crown a discretion to decide for
itself where the Indians' best interests lie. This is the effect of s. 18(1) of the Act." Like
Wilson J., Dickson J. went on to hold that the exercise of this discretion is subject to a
fiduciary obligation. The decision in Guerin that the Crown's fiduciary obligation
respecting reserve lands pre-dates s. 18 was affirmed inBlueberry River, supra note 85,
where the Supreme Court found that the Crown had breached this obligation in the
context of a surrender of reserve lands in the 1940s, which was prior to the enactment of
s. 18.
115 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1122-23: see note 15 and the accompanying text.
114
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broad."' 16 For him, the section clearly provides for any use of reserve land
that is for the "general welfare" and "present-day needs of aboriginal
communities."' 1 7 The ministerial discretion conferred by s. 18 over such a
broad range of uses might well be inconsistent with provincial laws
regulating and controlling land use, as those laws would interfere with the
exercise of that discretion. Regarding possession of reserve land, in
Derricksont 18 the Supreme Court found a direct conflict between
provisions of the British Columbia Family Relations Act 119 relating to the
division of real property and many of the sections of the Indian Act
referred to above. Specifically, Chouinard J. said that provisions in the
Family Relations Act "for orders dealing with ownership, right of
possession, transfer of title, partition or sale of property, severance of
joint tenancy are, in my view, in 'actual conflict' with the above
provisions of the Indian Act."'120 Moreover, in Paul'12 Chouinard, for the
Court, reached the same conclusion in regard to a section of the Family
Relations Act providing for an order for exclusive occupancy of a
matrimonial home.
We have seen, however, that actual conflict is not necessary for
provincial laws to be displaced by the Indian Act. Due to the closing
words of s. 88, occupation of the field is sufficient. 122 Moreover, the field
116

Ibid. at 1085.

117 Ibid. at

1086.

... Supra note 50.
119 Supra note 70.
120 Derrickson, supra note 50 at 302. Chouinard referred to ss. 18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 37,

42-50, 53, 81, and 89.
... Supra note 50.

122 See notes 96-100 and the accompanying text. See alsoDick, supra note 5 at 327-28,
where Beetz J. accepted that those words entail federal paramountcy by occupation of
the field. In Derrickson, supra note 50 at 300, Chouinard J. quoted, with apparent
approval, the following passage from P. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2nd ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 561-62, where the closing words of s. 88 are commented
on:

This language in its context seems to contemplate that a provincial law which makes
provision for any matter for which provision is made by (or under) the Indian Act
must yield to the provisions of the Indian Act. The doctrine of paramountcy, on the
other hand, at least as it has been interpreted recently, applies only where there is an
express contradiction between a federal and a provincial law. It does not apply where
the federal and provincial laws, while not in direct conflict, are merely occupying the
same field, or in other words making provision for the same matters. It seems
probable therefore that the closing words of s. 88 go further than the paramountcy
doctrine and will render inapplicable to Indians some provincial laws which would
have been applicable under the general law. [footnotes omitted]
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can be occupied where provision is made under as well as by the Act-for
example, by regulations. By ss. 57 and 73(1), the Governor in Council is
authorized to make regulations for various purposes, some of which
involve reserve land and its use. Among these purposes are the granting
of licences for timber cutting, disposition of surrendered mines and
minerals, protection of fur-bearing animals, fish, and other game,
destruction of noxious weeds, inspection of premises and the destruction,
alteration or renovation thereof, and the construction and maintenance of
boundary fences.123 Section 73(3) also gives the Governor in Council the
general power to "make orders and regulations to carry out the purposes
and provisions of this Act."
This regulation-making power has been used to make the Indian
Mining Regulations,124 which by s. 3 are made to apply to surrendered
mines and minerals underlying reserve lands, excluding reserves in
British Columbia. In addition to providing for matters such as exploration
and development permits, mineral leases, and royalties, these Regulations
referentially incorporate certain provincial laws: "4.Every permittee and
every lessee shall comply with the laws of the province in which his
permit area or lease area is situated where such laws relate to exploration
for, or development, production, treatment and marketing of minerals and
do not conflict with these Regulations."' 25 The Indian Timber

123

Note that Hogg has retained this passage almost word for word in the current loose-leaf
edition of his book at 27.3(c). Compare Monahan and Pettersupra note 73 at 170-72.
However, in Dick, supranote 5 at 327-28, Beetz J. expressed the opinion that thendian
Act could confer extended federal paramountcy over provincial laws by occupation of
the field only to the extent that provincial laws could not apply to Indians of their own
force. That was a major reason why he concluded that s. 88 must have the effect of
referentially incorporating provincial laws that would not so apply. See alsoNatural
Parents,supra note 32 at 763-64, Laskin C.J.C. CompareBank of Montreal v. Hall,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 at 151-55. For critical commentaryon this aspect of Dick, see
Ryder, supra note 12 at 356 note 207, and 372 note 273.
See also s. 81(1), which empowers band councils to make by-laws, not inconsistent with
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the Act or regulations made under it, for, among other things, the following matters in
relation to reserve lands: preventing trespass by domestic animals, construction and
maintenance of watercourses, roads, bridges, ditches, fences and other local works,
zoning and building regulation, survey and allotment of reserve lands among band
members, setting apart of lands for common use, control of noxious weeds, construction
and regulation of public wells and other water supplies, protection and management of
fur-bearing animals, fish and game, and removal and punishment of trespassers. Also, s.
83(1) authorizes band councils, with the approval of the Minister, to make by-laws for
taxation for local purposes of land or interests in land. While the exercise of these bylaw making powers is specific to each band, and therefore beyond the scope of this
article, it should be pointed out that when band by-laws occupy the field, they no doubt
exclude the application of provincial laws as effectively as regulations.
C.R.C. 1978, c. 956,amended SOR/90-468.
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Ibid,s. 4.
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Regulations126 deal with the cutting of timber on Indian reserves and
surrendered lands. Once again, there is provision for incorporation of
provincial laws: "25. Every licensee shall exercise the rights conferred by
the licence in accordance with the laws of the province in which the
licensee is operating under the licence regarding disposal 127
of slash,
prevention of fire hazard and the conduct of timber operations."'
Where oil and gas are concerned, Parliament has enacted separate
legislation in the form of the Indian Oil and Gas Act.' 28 Among other
things, this statute authorizes the Governor in Council to make regulations
respecting leases, licences, permits and royalties in relation to exploitation
of oil and gas on "Indian lands," which are defimed in part in s. 2 as "lands
reserved for the Indians, including any interests therein, surrendered in
accordance with the Indian Act.' 129 Pursuant to the Indian Oil and Gas
Act, the Governor in Council has made what are currently the Indian Oil
and Gas Regulations, 1995,130 containing comprehensive rules regarding
exploitation of oil and gas on reserves. Like the Indian Mining
Regulations and the Indian Timber Regulations, these Regulations
provide for referential incorporation of some provincial laws. For
example, s. 4 provides that, unless otherwise agreed by the Minister, it is
a condition of every oil and gas permit, lease, etc., that persons engaged
in activities related to the exploitation of oil or gas on Indian reserves
must comply with "all provincial laws applicable to non-Indian lands that
relate to the environment or to the exploration for, or development,
treatment, conservation or equitable production of, oil3 and gas and that
are not in conflict with the Act and these Regulations."' '
121 C.R.C. 1978, c. 961, amended SOR/93-244, SOR/94-690, SOR/95-531.
'

Ibid, s. 25.

R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-7, originally enacted S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 15, apparently to deal with
uncertainty over whether s. 57(c) of theIndian Act, F-S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, authorizing the
Governor in Council to make regulations "providing for the disposition of surrendered
mines and minerals underlying lands in a reserve," included the power to make
regulations respecting oil and gas under reserve lands (see thelndian Oil and Gas Act,
s. 3). In Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1086-87, Lamer C.J.C. relied on this Act to
support his conclusion that oil and gas, and minerals generally, are encompassed in the
Indian interest in reserves, and therefore in the Aboriginal interest in Aboriginal title
lands as well.
129 The words "lands reserved for Indians" in this definition might be interpreted broadly to
.

mean the same thing as those words in s. 91 (24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (see
notes 1-2 and the accompanying text), were it not for the fact that only Indian reserves
can be surrendered in accordance with the Indian Act.
130 SOR/94-753.
11 Ibid., s. 4. See also ss. 9(2) and 11.
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When these regulations relating to the development of natural
resources on reserves are combined with the Indian Act's extensive
provisions respecting the use and possession of reserve lands, it is
apparent that the field has been very largely occupied by federal law
where those lands are concerned, leaving little or no room for
incorporation of provincial land laws by s. 88. In contexts where
Parliament or the Governor in Council thought it appropriate to
incorporate provincial laws in relation to land or natural resources, we
have seen that the Act and regulations made under it expressly provide for
that. These considerations alone should be sufficient to lay to rest any
contention that Parliament implicitly intended s. 88 to render provincial
laws applicable to reserve lands as well as to Indians, as there would be
no reason to referentially incorporate provincial laws in relation to matters
that are so completely provided for by the Indian Act itself. Taken
together with the long-standing case law and the other arguments
discussed above, this makes the conclusion that s. 88 does not make
provincial laws in relation to land apply on reserves virtually inescapable.
However, provisions in the Indian Act and regulations made
thereunder relating to the use and possession of land do not apply to
Aboriginal title lands that are located outside reserves. We therefore still
have to consider whether s. 88 could have the effect of making provincial
laws in relation to land apply to those lands.
V.

ABORIGINAL TITLE AND SECTION 88

The Indian Act was enacted by Parliament pursuant to the constitutional
jurisdiction conferred on it by s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
However, Parliament clearly did not exercise the full extent of its
jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians," when it
passed this statute. In two respects that are particularly relevant to our
discussion, Parliament refrained from fully exercising its s. 91(24)
powers.
First, the definition of "Indian" in the Indian Act does not include all
the Aboriginal persons who come within the meaning of the term
"Indians" in s. 91(24). This omission was revealed by a reference to the
Supreme Court of Canada by the federal government in 1938 to determine
whether the Inuit of northern Quebec are within federal jurisdiction over
"Indians."' 132 In its ensuing judgment in Reference re: British North
132 Interestingly,

the federal government argued that the Inuit are not "Indians," while the

Quebec government argued that they are. Evidently both governments wanted toavoid

jurisdiction where the Inuit are concerned, an intriguing reversal of their usual positions

where constitutional powers are at stake.
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America Act, 1867 (U.K.), s. 91133 the Court held that Inuit are indeed
"Indians" for the purposes of s. 91(24).13 However, as there is no
obligation on Parliament to legislate to the full extent of its powers, it did
not have to include the Inuit in the Indian Act, and in fact chose to
expressly exclude them by providing in s. 4(1) that "[a] reference in this
Act to an Indian does not include any person of the race of aborigines
commonly referred to as Inuit."1 35 This exclusion of the Inuit from the
Act would create an anomalous situation if the reference to "Indians" in s.
88 were used to make provincial laws in relation to land apply to
Aboriginal title lands held by Indian Act Indians. As the Inuit are not
within the Act's definition of "Indian," they are outside the scope of s.
88.136 This means that their Aboriginal title lands must be outside the
scope of s. 88 as well. 3 7 So if s. 88 renders provincial land laws
applicable to the Aboriginal title lands of Indian Act Indians, the
Aboriginal title lands of those Indians would be subject to provincial land
laws of general application, whereas any Aboriginal title lands of the Inuit
within the provinces would not. This makes no sense.
The second respect in which Parliament has not fully exercised its s.
91(24) powers is in regard to Aboriginal title lands themselves. The
provisions of the IndianAct relating to the use and possession of lands are
generally limited in their application to reserves, and to a lesser extent to
surrendered reserve lands. "Reserve" is defined in part in s. 2(1) as "a
tract of land, the legal title to which is vested in Her Majesty, that has
been set apart by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a band." 138 Ever
since the decision of the Privy Council in the St. Catherine'sMilling case
in 1888, it has nonetheless been known that Parliament has exclusive
jurisdiction over unsurrendered Indian lands that were reserved for Indian
use by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, even though not included in
Indian Act reserves. 139 Can it have been intended, when what is now s. 88
13

Supra note 5.

Also within s. 91(24) but outside the Indian Act are so-called "non-status Indians"
(Indians who either were not accorded status by being included in the Act's definition
of "Indian," or who lost their status). Whether the M1tis are also "Indians" for the
purposes of s. 91(24) remains an open question: see note 5.
135 Indian Act, supra note 4, s. 4(1).A version of this section was added to the Act when it
was revised in 1951, possibly as a response to the decision inReference re: British
"4

North America Act, 1867 (T.K.),s. 91, supranote 5.
136

See note 77 and the accompanying text.
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See note 78 and the accompanying text.
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Indian Act, supranote 4, s. 2 (1).
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In St. Catherine'sMilling,supranote 19 at 59, Lord Watson said that the words "Lands
reserved for the Indians" in s. 91(24) "include all lands reserved, upon any terms or
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was added to the Act in 1951, that the section would extend the
application of provincial laws to those lands? This intention seems highly
unlikely, given that the scope of the Act is generally limited to Indians
and reserves as defined therein. Just as s. 88 does not make the provincial
laws incorporated by it apply to the Inuit, it cannot have been intended to
make provincial land laws apply to Indian lands that are not within
reserves. If s. 88 were interpreted otherwise, that would extend the reach
of the section far beyond the geographical scope of the rest of the Act,
insofar as the lands of Indian Act Indians are concerned. As that would
not be in keeping with the general scheme of the Act, surely it was not
intended. 140

However, in our earlier discussion we concluded that Parliament in
1951 was probably of the view that, apart from treaty, there were no
legally enforceable Aboriginal land rights outside of reserves. 14 1 If this
was the opinion of the legislators, the argument that they did not intend to
make provincial laws apply to Aboriginal title lands is much stronger, as
they could not have had the intention to make those laws apply to an
entity that for them was non-existent.
These considerations fortify the arguments based on principles of
statutory interpretation made earlier in this article, arguments that apply
as much in relation to Aboriginal title lands as to reserves. As we have
seen, the expressio unius maxim and the principle that legislation relating
to the Aboriginal peoples has to be construed liberally, and ambiguities
resolved in their favour, support the conclusion that s. 88 was not
intended to make provincial laws apply to s. 91(24) lands. 142 Moreover,
since the Delgamuukw decision held that Aboriginal title lands are as
much under exclusive federal jurisdiction as are reserves, 143 the case law
holding that provincial land laws do not apply to reserves of their own
force, and are not made to apply thereto by s. 88, is generally applicable
to Aboriginal title lands as well.' 44

142

conditions, for Indian occupation." For him, this included lands reserved by the Royal
Proclamation as well as lands that had been formally set apart as "Indian reserves." In
Delgamuukw,supranote 1 at 1116-18, Lamer C.J.C. clarified that Aboriginal title lands
are within the scope of s. 91(24) as well.
For affirmation that provisions of the Indian Act have to be interpreted in light of the
Act's general scheme, see R. v. Devereux, [1965] S.C.R. 567 at572, Judson J.; Boyer,
supra note 50 at 310, Marceau J., and at 313-14, MacGuigan J.
As discussed above, this would explain why only treaty rights were protected from the
application of provincial laws by s. 88: see notes 19-23 and the accompanying text.
See notes 86-88 and the accompanying text.
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Delgamuukw, supranote 1 at 1116-18.

144

See notes 49-72 and the accompanying text.
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It is therefore concluded that s. 88, even if its constitutionality has not
been impaired by s. 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982,145 does not have
the effect of making provincial laws in relation to land apply to any
"[l]ands reserved for the Indians," including Aboriginal title lands.
Accordingly, s. 88 does not authorize provincial infringement of
Aboriginal title by referential incorporation of provincial land laws into
federal law. Given exclusive federal jurisdiction over Aboriginal title, this
must mean that the provinces have no power to infringe that title, as
provincial infringement would involve encroachment on the core of
federal jurisdiction over "[1]ands reserved for the Indians,"
which is
46
protected by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.
The implications of this conclusion for a province like British
Columbia with large outstanding land claims are obviously enormous. As
a matter of constitutional law, it means that the provincial government
lacks both the executive and legislative power to authorize or engage in
any use or development of Aboriginal title lands. 14 7 Due to s. 91(24) and
well-established principles relating to the division of powers, the province
actually has much less authority over Aboriginal title lands than it has
over privately owned lands, which are subject to provincial control and
legislatively authorized expropriation. Moreover, even the province's
authority to regulate use of Aboriginal title lands by the Aboriginal
titleholders themselves is severely limited. Provincial laws can still affect
Aboriginal title lands incidentally, but only if those laws are characterized
as being
in relation to some valid head of provincial power other than
14
land.
The Delgamuukw decision has obviously shaken the constitutional
structure of Canada insofar as jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands is
concerned. But while this aspect of the decision will no doubt have
profound doctrinal and practical effects, it would be wrong to regard it as

145 See notes 26-48 and the accompanying text, where the constitutional validity of s. 88 is
discussed.
146 See notes 1-10 and the accompanying text, especially the articles cited in notes 8 and
10.
147 Note, however, that the location and extent of those lands remains uncertain. Even

Delgamuukw, supranote 1, did not decide whether the Gitxsan (spelled Gitksan inthe
judgments) and Wet'suwet'en have Aboriginal title to any lands, as that issue was
remitted to trial to be determined on the basis of the rules the Supreme Court laid down
for proof of that title. For further discussion, see K. McNeil,Defining Aboriginal Title
in the 90's: Has the Supreme CourtFinally Got It Right? (Toronto: Robarts Centre for
Canadian Studies, York University, 1998).
143 See notes 49-53 and the accompanying text.
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some kind of "judicial revolution."' 149 In fact, the decision did not really
change anything constitutionally-instead, what it did was clarify some
constitutional issues that have been around for a long time, but
conveniently ignored, especially by the provinces. Ever since the St.
Catherine's Milling decision in 1888,' 5 it has been apparent that
exclusive federal jurisdiction over "[lands reserved for the Indians"
might well include jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands. 15 So in acting
as though it had constitutional authority over Aboriginal title lands in
British Columbia, the province has skated on thin constitutional ice for
over a century.' 52 In reality, it appears that the province has been violating
Aboriginal title in an unconstitutional and therefore illegal fashion ever
since it joined Canada in 187l.' 5' What is truly disturbing is not that the
province can no longer
do so, but that it has been able to get away with it
54
for so many years.'
149

1 have borrowed this phrase from the title of M.A. Stephenson's book, Mabo: A Judicial

Revolution (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1993). See also H. Foster,
"Aboriginal Title and the Provincial Obligation to Respect It: lsDelgamuukv v. British
Columbia 'Invented Law'?" (1998) 56 The Advocate 221.
'so Supra note 19.
151 See note 139 and the accompanying text. In fact, inDelgamuumkv, supra note I at 1116-

17, Lamer C.J.C. regarded this issue as already decided by St. Catherine's Milling,
supra note 19. For detailed scholarly treatment of this issue almost twenty years ago,
see R. D.J. Pugh, "Are Northem Lands Reserved for the Indians?" (1982) 60 Can. Bar
Rev. 36. See also Lysyk, supra note 55 at 516, suggesting in 1967 that, if the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 applies in British Columbia (a question that is still unresolved by
the Supreme Court, though of much less importance since the decisions in Calder,
supra note 20, and Delgamuukw), there could be "a broader ambit of federal authority
in relation to 'lands reserved for the Indians' than is generally conceded."
152 Of course, until recently British Columbia sought to avoid the issue entirely by denying
the very existence of Aboriginal title in the province, a position that has been equally
tenuous since the 1973 decision of the Supreme Court inCalder,supra note 20. See
generally P. Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in
British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990);
R. Fisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-EuropeanRelations in British Columbia, 17741890, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1992); H. Foster,
"Letting Go the Bone: The Idea of Indian Title in British Columbia, 1849-1927," in
Foster and McLaren, eds., Essays in the History of CanadianLaw, Vol. VI: British
Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Osgoode
Society, 1995) 28.
153 Unfortunately, this is not the only instance of long-term unconstitutional behaviour by a
province. Manitoba suppressed the constitutional language rights of the French minority
in that province for over ninety years before being called to task by the Supreme Court:
see Reference Re ManitobaLanguage Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
154 There may, however, be a large compensation bill to pay for past violations. This
complex issue, which was raised but left unresolved in Delgamuukv, supra note 1,
cannot be pursued here.

